| RESEARCH AND TRAINING REACTORS
The American Nuclear Society (ANS) recognizes that the nation’s research and training reactors are important elements of the U.S. nuclear science and technology education, training, and research infrastructure. Therefore, the ANS endorses government, industry, and university programs that maintain an appropriately sized fleet of research and training reactors at U.S. universities, national laboratories, and corporations. The national interests served by training and research reactors include the following: • Development of high-technology applications in fields such as materials science, fluid dynamics, and biomedical science where neutron sources are needed • Advances in the areas of power reactor safety and establishing the scientific bases for new reactor designs • Training of personnel needed to operate, maintain, regulate, and improve reactors and other facilities associated with national defense and nuclear power activities, and to manage and direct the technology development and nuclear science research needed to maintain the national infrastructure. Reactors can continue to be used to provide very useful training to students or new researchers in neutron and radiation technologies and engineering education at the graduate level, and they provide powerful tools for the advancement of other academic disciplines. Nuclear Research Centers building Weapons of Mass Destruction Negev Nuclear Research Center The Negev Nuclear Research Center is an Israeli nuclear installation located in the Negev desert, about ten kilometers to the south of the city of Dimona. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance according to the secret Protocol of Sèvres agreements. The complex was constructed in secret, and outside the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection regime. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalination plant bound for Latin America. The purpose of Dimona is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that. However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, as part of a policy of deliberate ambiguity. The Dimona reactor went on-line some time between 1962 and 1964, and with the plutonium produced there, perhaps together with enriched uranium, the Israel Defence Forces most probably had their first nuclear weapons ready before the Six-Day War. When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of Dimona in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that US, rather than International Atomic Energy Agency, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advance notice of all inspections. Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site (manufacturing of nuclear weapons) from the inspectors, by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless, due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. By 1969 the U.S. believed that Israel might have a nuclear weapon, and terminated inspections that year. The Dimona reactor was overflown by unidentified jet aircraft in the days before the Six Day War in 1967 which increased tensions and may have helped spur on the conflict. Recent documentation released by Russia suggests the jets may have in fact been Soviet in origin, and not Arab as previously thought. In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at Dimona, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli agents abducted him from Italy and transported him to Israel. An Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage And sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. At the time of Vanunu's arrest, The Times reported that Israel had material for approximately 20 hydrogen bombs and 200 fission bombs. In the spring of 2004, Vanunu was released from prison, and placed under several restrictions (such as the denial of a passport and restrictions on communications with the press). He was rearrested and charged in 2005 for violations of the terms of his release. Dimona's reactor was defended by batteries of Patriot missiles in anticipation of strikes from Iraq in 2002 to 2003. Recently safety concerns about this 40-year-old reactor have been reported. In 2004 as a preventive measure Israeli authorities distributed iodine anti-radiation tablets to thousands of residents living nearby. In 2006 a group of local residents was formed due to concerns regarding health and safety from living near the reactor. Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center The Iraqi nuclear weapons effort received raw uranium for processing from mines at Ukashat. Seven facilities were promiment in the calutron enrichment program. Four of these facilities, al-Jesira, al-Atheer and al-Rabbiyah and al-Dijjla at Zafaraniyah, had not been identified by American intelligence as being associated with the nuclear weapons program and consequently escaped any significant damage from coalition airstrikes during the Gulf War. The three other facilities -- Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, and al-Fajar -- were previoiusly identified by American intelligence as being associated with the nuclear weapons program and suffered extensive damage during the War. Baghdad was operating approximately 25 calutron units; 20 at Tarmiya where uranium was enriched to 35%, and 5 at Tuwaitha where enrichment levels of approximately 95% were achieved. Another program for the production of uranium under the Petrochemical-3 project used gas centrifuge enrichment, with two facilities at Al Furat and Rashidiya And a third under construction at Taji. As of 2002, the only known store of nuclear material in Iraq is in heavyweight sealed barrels at the Tawaitha research facility south of Baghdad. It consists of several tons of low-grade uranium and is monitored by an international agency with the full co-operation of the Iraqi regime. Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located 18 km SSE of Baghdad, was the main site for Iraqi nuclear program. Tuwaitha is the location of the Osiraq reactor bombed by Israel in 1981. The Al Asil General Establishment at Al Tuweitha was the headquarters of the Iraqi Nuclear Commission. Activities included several research reactors, plutonium separation and waste processing, uranium metallurgy, neutron initiator development and work on number of methods of uranium enrichment. The Pure Lead Project at Al Tuweitha was engaged in the development of shielding for the nuclear weapons program. Experiments on enrichment were conducted in the Laboratory Workshop Building (LWB). Operations in this building focused on the enrichment of uranium work included experiments with centrifuge, electromagnetic separator, and laser separation experiments. Also in this building was a group working on chemical processes using acetone. All nuclear fuel at this site was removed under IAEA monitoring. Equipment directly tied to the nuclear weapons program was destroyed in place. In April 1991, Iraq’s inventory of safeguarded highly enriched uranium included 35.58 kilograms of U235, which had been irradiated but could not be readily used in weapons production since the fissile material would have been difficult to extract quickly from the irradiated fuel. This material was held at two storage locations: a fuel pond, which contained the reactor core and fuel storage racks; and an emergency storage where fueld from the Tammuz-2 reactor core and associated pond had been transferred during the Gulf War. This emergency storage, designated "location B", consisted of pits in a farmland area a few miles from the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center. The Al Tuwaitha nuclear center was extensively equipped with "hot cells" for dealing with radioactive material, although many were severely damaged during bombing. However, concern remained about possible reconstruction and future use of the undamaged cells. Therefore, during the seventh inspection, these cells were rendered harmless by cutting off the manipulator arms and control wires. Associated glove boxes were rendered useless by pouring cement into them. As a long-term measure, epoxy resin was used along with cement to render harmless the mixers-settlers. The seventh and eighth IAEA inspections revealed special equipment essential to the nuclear weaponization programme for warhead development and assembly as distinct from nuclear material production. Two special video cameras ("streak cameras") were removed from Iraq and other equipment was sealed pending decisions on removal, destruction or monitoring. By June 2004 Iraqi authorities had begun rebuilding facilities at the Tuwaitha research center once used by Saddam Hussein to pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions. The reconstruction under way at Tuwaitha, despite its potential for generating controversy, was no secret. The effort involved cleaning out, repairing, painting, and refurnishing office and laboratory buildings at the site. The intention is to create space to house research and development efforts by Iraq's newly reconstituted Ministry of Science and Technology. Those research efforts will focus on agriculture, water, petrochemical and other projects. The cost of reconstruction was estimated at about 30-million dollars. The Coalition Provisional Authority is not financing the rebuilding. The Development Fund for Iraq, established by the United Nations, is paying it for. The United States has been a major donor to the fund and the Coalition Provisional Authority manages it. While it is unclear whether Iraqi scientists will be able to conduct nuclear research at Tuwaitha again, there has been radioactive contamination at the site and radioactive materials once stored there are missing. NEPTUNO - Education and training in nuclear engineering and safety On nuclear energy, within the 6th Euratom research and training programme, the European Commission supports the project: "Nuclear European Platform of Training and University Organizations, NEPTUNO". 35 partners from industry, training centres, academic institutions and research laboratories participate in it. (NEPTUNO website). The ENEN project objective: "to preserve, enhance and strengthen nuclear knowledge", is taken along in the NEPTUNO project. However as the former concentrated on higher education, the latter strives for education and training in the perspective of Continued Professional Development. The rationale is based on internationalization and globalization of the nuclear industry and nuclear energy production requesting for mobility, accreditation and recognition of qualified licensed staff. Within NEPTUNO, proposals are formulated for best practices for mobility, accreditation and recognition of qualified licensed staff and in general all staff needing some form of education, schooling or training before operating in the nuclear industry. The ongoing trends towards co-operation between training organizations, research institutes and academia is facilitated. Amongst others, attention is also given to the re-training of trainers and to the modular schemes for staff not requiring the full academic education program, in other words contributing to life long learning schemes. "Training" is the terminology used in the NEPTUNO initiative to describe the schooling activities other than the regular academic education schemes. The NEPTUNO project strives for training (technicians, engineers) and education (master, PhD, post-doctoral) on equal terms of quality. Re-inspire nuclear education and training The present day reflections on nuclear knowledge management and the different initiatives taken, definitely catalyze networking in the nuclear education and training domain, internally in several countries as well on inter-academic level as between academia, research centres, regulatory bodies and utilities. Examples can be identified in a.o. Belgium, Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, …The approach stimulates in an organic fashion, the process of identifying centres of excellence in the different disciplines of nuclear education and training. The approach also stimulates related disciplines e.g. radiation protection to develop similar strategies and policies. Careers in the Nuclear Industry Careers in nuclear energy offer challenging work with competitive salaries and benefits. The industry needs engineers, technicians, craft workers and other professionals in positions ranging from entry-level to mid-career and those with military training and service.
CAUSES FOR CONCERN Little strategic planning Little strategic planning – involving government and industry – is occurring in which nuclear technology is recognized as potentially important in helping to solve important future problems such as increasing greenhouse gas emissions in the face of strongly growing global energy demands and limited energy choices. In an era of deregulation, privatisation, and downsizing, there are increasing pressures for decisions to be made based upon economic short-term considerations. As a result, the nuclear industry in many OECD countries is consolidating and contracting. Now there are few new nuclear power plants in OECD countries. Governments are the appropriate institutions for assuring longer-term well being when it appears that market forces alone will not be sufficient. But government support for nuclear programme has been being eroded. Students’ negative perception The number of degrees with a nuclear content awarded to students has generally decreased. Student perception, an important factor contributing to low enrolment, is affected by the educational circumstances, public perception, industry’s activities, and government-funded nuclear programmes. Many in the public, including a student’s parents, teachers, and friends, may share the negative perception. The lack of new nuclear power plant construction (a symbolic issue in nuclear activities), the privatisation of nuclear plants, and weak government support to nuclear programmes create an unclear image of the future. The combination leads young students to believe that job prospects are poor and that there is little interesting research. Nuclear is broader than “nuclear power,” but it is hardly ever perceived as such. Consequently, students hesitate to enter the nuclear field. The downward spiral of low enrolment and budgetary cut Because of these limiting conditions, nuclear programmes have failed to attract young students, who are sensitive to educational circumstances and career opportunities. Low enrolment directly affects budgets, and budgetary cuts then limit the facilities available for nuclear programmes. Unless something is done to arrest it, the downward spiral will continue. And there will be no quick fix to re-supply the pipeline of students, faculty, researchers, operators, regulators, and the companion infrastructure. |
